Robert Barro's pony express to lower unemployment

In a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed (why do I read these!?), Harvard economist Robert Barro claims that "according to [his] calculations" without extended unemployment benefits the unemployment rate would now be 6.8%. What are these calculations? Glad you asked!

To get a rough quantitative estimate of the implications for the unemployment rate, suppose that the expansion of unemployment-insurance coverage to 99 weeks had not occurred and—I assume—the share of long-term unemployment had equaled the peak value of 24.5% observed in July 1983. Then, if the number of unemployed 26 weeks or less in June 2010 had still equaled the observed value of 7.9 million, the total number of unemployed would have been 10.4 million rather than 14.6 million. If the labor force still equaled the observed value (153.7 million), the unemployment rate would have been 6.8% rather than 9.5%.

See? If you assume that long-term unemployment is caused by extended unemployment insurance benefits, then removing unemployment insurance extensions solves the problem of long-term unemployment (and you get a pony!). This must be why he makes the big bucks. Magical thinking.

Suppose we make a different assumption. Let's assume that changes in consumer demand has an effect on the level of employment. If so, then the decision to not extend unemployment benefits would reduce demand for goods and services. Where will the jobs come from? Businesses are not going to expand their capacity or their workforce in the face of falling demand for their products. The only way that extending unemployment benefits could actually increase the unemployment rate above what it would otherwise be (other than just assuming it will, as Barro does) is to assume that the people receiving those benefits, rather than spending them on food and rent, use the checks to set fires to businesses that are currently employing people. This assumption has the advantage of actually leading to the conclusion that Barro reaches, without magic.

Update: cross-posted at Multiplier Effect.

The Real Deal on Cap and Trade

In New Deal for U.S. Climate Policy? at The Baseline Scenario, Jim Boyce outlines the Cantwell-Collins CLEAR (Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal) Act, a superior alternative to the cap and trade portion of the Waxman-Markey (ACES) act that passed the House earlier this year.

See this post for more.

CBO Brief on Costs of Cap and Trade

In an Economic and Budget Issue Brief released today, the Congressional Budget Office reviews various aspects of the costs of achieving greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Here's a take-away from the conclusion:

CBO concluded that under H.R. 2454 the loss of aggregate purchasing power would increase from about 0.1 percent in 2012 to 0.8 percent in 2050. Those losses would be distributed in ways that tend to benefit lower-income households. In 2020, households in the highest income quintile would see a loss in purchasing power of 0.1 percent of after-tax income, and households in the middle quintile would experience a loss equivalent to 0.6 percent. Households in the lowest quintile, by contrast, would see an average gain of 0.7 percent. By 2050, households in the highest quintile would see a loss in purchasing power of 0.7 percent of after-tax income, and households in the middle quintile would see a loss of 1.1 percent. Those in the lowest quintile would see a 2.1 percent increase.

H.R. 2454 is the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as Waxman-Markey (it's nowhere near as good as H.R. 1862, the Cap and Dividend Act of 2009 introduced by Rep. Van Hollen, which is considerably shorter, clearer, auctions all permits, and distributes all of the proceeds minus administrative costs to every legal resident on a monthly basis). Good to remember the next time some know-nothing congressperson emotes about the huge cost of cap and trade legislation to the people that he or she claims to care so deeply about.
(thanks to Jim Boyce for the tip about the Van Hollen bill)